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ENHANCING THE WTO TOOL KIT:  THE CASE FOR
FINANCIAL COMPENSATION
Rebecca Ullman
INTRODUCTION
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Understanding
160 represents an intersection of domestic law and international law.
The subject of Dispute Settlement Understanding 160 (“DSU 160”) is
the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, an American legislative act that
extended copyright protection terms and carved out significant exemp-
tions for commercial establishments.1  The exemptions set forth in the
Fairness in Music Licensing Act (“FMLA”) conflict with U.S. interna-
tional intellectual property obligations such that one must question
whether there should be new and different remedies available to assist
parties in meeting their international obligations.
The objective of this paper is to provide background informa-
tion on DSU 160 and an update as to its recent progress, or lack
thereof, and to argue that the case, as it stands now, is convincing evi-
dence that financial compensation should be a remedy available to
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) members.  Section I provides a
context of the FMLA within the history of public performance rights in
American copyright law, detailing the provisions of the legislation in
question.  Section II discusses the FMLA in the context of interna-
tional copyright obligations and the development of DSU 160.  Section
III describes the currently available WTO remedies and introduces the
concept of financial compensation as a remedy.  Finally, Section IV
presents a hypothetical situation in which financial compensation is
used as a remedy in DSU 160, and argues that such a situation
presents strong evidence in favor of adopting financial compensation
as a WTO remedy.
I. HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
From its inception, the United States recognized the value and
importance of copyright protection.  The U.S. Constitution contains a
clause authorizing Congress to enact legislation granting authors the
right to benefit from their literary production.2  Many attribute the
cultural and economic power of the United States to its early embrace
1 Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2830
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 110, 504 & 512) [hereinafter FMLA].
2 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8 cl. 8.
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of copyright protection and the reward and incentive it offered authors
in the form of a limited monopoly.3
Congress granted copyright owners the right to control public
performances of dramatic compositions in 1856,4 and the public per-
formance right was extended to musical works in 1897.5  The 1909
Copyright Act provided some protection against unauthorized public
performance of a non-dramatic musical work.6  Owners of non-dra-
matic musical works had only the right to prevent unauthorized for
profit performance, whereas non-profit, non-dramatic musical per-
formances were exempt.  Owners of dramatic works had the exclusive
right to control public performance regardless of whether it was for
profit.7
After the passage of the 1909 Act, the term “for profit” was the
focus of much disagreement.  Clearly, a concert at which the audience
paid to hear a singer or listen to a recording was considered for profit.
But what about music played in restaurants, retail stores, or hotels?
In these situations, the music is not the focus of the economic transac-
tion, but played because it adds to the atmosphere and contributes to
the profit earned by the establishment.  The U.S. Supreme Court first
interpreted the term “for profit” in Herbert v. Shanley Co. where it
found that to establish that music was played for profit, a plaintiff only
had to show that the music contributed to the profitability of the estab-
lishment.8  In the opinion, Justice Holmes stated:
It is true that the music is not the sole object, but neither
is the food, which could be cheaper elsewhere.  The object
is a repast in surroundings that to people having limited
powers of conversation, or disliking the rival noise, give a
luxurious pleasure not to be had from eating a silent
meal.9
In Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty, a hotel broadcasted radio
programming over loudspeakers into the guest rooms.10  The Supreme
Court held that the broadcast constituted a public performance under
3 See generally Todd Hagins, Robbing Peter Gabriel to Pay Paul’s Diner: Plunder,
the Free Market, and the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL
385, 389 nn.12–13 (2003) (citing articles discussing the Americanization of Euro-
pean television and the important role of intellectual property in the global mar-
ketplace and the value of companies trademarks).
4 Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138–39 (1856).
5 Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481 (1897).
6 Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §1 (1976) (repealed 1976).
7 Id. at §1(d).
8 Herbert v. Shanley, 242 U.S. 591, 595 (1917).
9  Id.
10 Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty, 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
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the 1909 Copyright Act, and in doing so, established the doctrine of
“multiple performances.”11 Under this doctrine, the first performance
is the original broadcast by the radio station (which must be licensed),
and the second is the commercial establishment’s broadcast of radio
programming over speakers (which had to be licensed in for-profit situ-
ations under the 1909 Copyright Act).  The Court emphasized the ho-
tel’s control over the music and compared it to hiring an orchestra to
play live music: “[i]n each the music is produced by the instrumentali-
ties under its control.”12
After the Buck decision, copyright owners sought enforcement
of their newly elaborated right to receive compensation for re-broad-
casts of radio programming.13  If a commercial establishment wanted
to play the radio, and therefore create a multiple performance, they
were required to obtain a license.  Performing rights organizations,
such as the American Society of Composers, Artists, and Publishers
(“ASCAP”), soon began including, and charging for, specific provisions
for multiple performances in their standard licenses.14  The right to
collect for re-broadcasts was also extended to cable television.15  Those
who did not purchase a license risked liability.
The Supreme Court returned to the issue of re-broadcasts in
1975 in Twentieth Century Music Corp v. Aiken, where copyright own-
ers sued for infringement a small fast food restaurant that played the
radio via a receiver and four speakers of the type typically found in
private homes.16  The copyright owners claimed the broadcast consti-
tuted a performance for which they were not compensated.17  The
Court held that playing the radio in such a manner did not constitute a
performance because of the small size of the establishment and the
limited broadcasting equipment.18  The Court also used a floodgates
argument, stating that thousands of small businesses would be subject
to liability should the Court find it was a performance.19
The Aiken decision became the basis for statutory exemptions
in the 1976 Copyright Act.  The House Conference Report stated:
11 Id.; David E. Shipley, Copyright Law and Your Neighborhood Bar and Grill:
Recent Developments in Performance Rights and the Section 110(5) Exemption, 29
ARIZ. L. REV. 475, 480 (1987).
12 Buck, 283 U.S. at 201.
13 Shipley, supra note 11 at 480–81.
14 Id. at 481.
15 Id. at 481–82.
16 Twentieth Century Music v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 152–53 (1975).
17 Id. at 153.
18 Id. at 162
19 See id.
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It is the intent of the conferees that a small commercial
establishment of the type involved in Twentieth Century
Music Corp v. Aiken . . . which merely augmented the
home-type receiver and which was not of sufficient size
to justify, as a practical matter, a subscription to a com-
mercial background music service, would be exempt.
However, where the public communication was by means
of something other than a home-type receiving appara-
tus, or where the establishment actually makes a further
transmission to the public, the exemption would not
apply.20
The final version of the 1976 Copyright Act gave the owner of a copy-
right in a musical composition the exclusive right to “perform the copy-
righted work publicly.”21  The Act defines perform as “[to] recite,
render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device
or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompany-
ing it audible.”22  The Act defined public as a performance that was
either in a space open to the public or a place where a “substantial
number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered.”23  A transmission is considered to be a
public performance if it is transmitted to the public, “whether the
membership of the public capable of receiving the performance or dis-
play receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same
time or at different times.”24  Section 110(5)(A), entitled the “Homes-
tyle Exemption,” carved out a public performance exemption for:
Communication of a transmission embodying a perform-
ance or display of a work by the public reception of the
transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a kind
commonly used in private homes, unless —
(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the
transmission; or
(B) the transmission thus received is further
transmitted to the public.25
Although the 1976 Copyright Act sought to clarify the rules re-
garding radio play in small commercial establishments, it left many of
the statutory terms undefined, and thus open to judicial interpreta-
20 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1733, at 75 (1976) (Conf. Rep.).
21 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 106(4) 90 Stat. 2541.
22 Id. at § 101.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at § 110(5)(A).
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tion.26  Courts had differing opinions on what constituted homestyle
equipment, whether it was acceptable to hide the speakers from view,
and whether “small commercial establishment” referred to the physi-
cal size of the premises in question only or the size of the parent com-
pany.27  Courts agreed that modifying homestyle equipment to
increase its impact disqualifies the user from the Homestyle Exemp-
tion; that, in general, the greater number of speakers, the less the
chance of exemption; and that the use of homestyle equipment does
not give the user permission to further transmit the broadcast.28
The public performance exemption was further explicated in
the FMLA of 1998.29  The main purpose of the FMLA was to extend
the term of copyright protection, but it also included modifications to
the Homestyle Exemption in Section 110(5) of the 1976 Copyright
Act.30  The original Homestyle Exemption moved to subsection (A) and
a second exemption, called the Business Exemption, was added in sub-
section (B) to cover the performance of non-dramatic musical works in
commercial establishments.31  The Business Exemption is divided into
two sections, one covering restaurants and the other general commer-
cial enterprises.  If a general commercial enterprise is less than 2,000
gross square feet, then it does not need to obtain a license to play mu-
sic via a radio or television.32  If it is more than 2,000 gross square
feet, it is subject to restrictions regarding the equipment through
which it re-broadcasts.33  Thus, to be exempt, audio equipment may
have no more than six loudspeakers in total and no more than four per
room.34  With audiovisual equipment, there may be no more than four
televisions per room, no more than six televisions total, and no televi-
sion with a screen greater than fifty-five inches.35  Restaurants
smaller than 3,750 gross square feet are exempt from re-broadcast li-
censes, and those larger than 3,750 gross square feet must follow the
same restrictions as general commercial establishments larger than
2,000 gross square feet.36
26 See Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 21 at § 101.
27 Laura A. McCluggage, Section 110(5) and the Fairness in Music Licensing Act:
Will the WTO Decide the United States Must Pay to Play?, 40 IDEA 1, 12–15 (2000).
28 Id.
29 FMLA, supra note 1.
30 Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 21 at § 1105(5).
31 Id.
32 Id. at § 110(5)(B).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
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The FMLA, in general, was a product of concerted lobbying ef-
forts.37  Lobbies for copyright owners, including the Disney Corpora-
tion and famous singers like Don Henley from the musical group The
Eagles, testified before Congress, urging it to extend the term of pro-
tection.38  The exemptions in Section 110(5)(B) were the result of lob-
bying efforts by the restaurant and bar associations.39  The
exemptions were hotly contested by U.S. performing rights organiza-
tions.40  In testimony before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellec-
tual Property, Wayland Holyfield, a singer, songwriter, and
representative of ASCAP, said:
We’re individual American songwriters who have made
American music the most popular in the world. Our ef-
forts should be the pride of all Americans. Instead, here
we are defending ourselves against legislation which
would take our property and give it for free to people who
would profit from it. And that’s the whole deal about why
we’re here.41
Conversely, Peter Madland, a restaurant owner and representative of
Wisconsin taverns, said:
The issue is a very, very complicated one, but let’s keep
in mind we do have 134 cosponsors to this bill. There was
a national survey that said 72 percent of the people
agreed that restaurants and bars should not have to pay
for use of radio and television. These are your constitu-
ents that say this. I don’t know what they do for contri-
butions, but they’re your constituents, and I think you,
as Congress people, should listen to them.42
37 Hagins, supra note 3 at 402.
38 Christina N. Gifford, The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 30 U.
MEM. L. REV. 363, 388 (2000).
39 See generally Music Licensing in Restaurants and Retail and Other Establish-
ments: Hearing on H.R. 789 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intell. Prop.,
106th Cong. 74 (1997).
40 See e.g., Music Licensing in Restaurants and Retail and Other Establishments:
Hearings on H.R. 789 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property,
106th Cong. 4 (1997) (statement of Howard Coble, Chairman Subcomm. on Courts
and Intellectual Property).
41 Music Licensing in Restaurants and Retail and Other Establishments: Hearing
on H.R. 789 Before the Subcomm. On Courts and Intellectual Property, 106th
Cong. 73, 74 (1997) (statement of Wayne Holyfield, songwriter).
42 Music Licensing in Restaurants and Retail and Other Establishments: Hearing
on H.R. 789 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual. Property, 106th
Cong. 216 and 219 (1997) (statement of Peter Madland, tavern owner).
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Restaurant and store owners were victorious and saw the Business
Exemption enacted, but the controversy soon moved to the interna-
tional stage.
II. INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION AND DSU 160
A. International Copyright Legislation
The FMLA took what was essentially a de minimis exemption
in Section 110(5) of the 1976 Copyright Act and broadened it consider-
ably.43  Even before the FMLA was enacted, various experts expressed
concern that the newly broadened exemptions would conflict with in-
ternational obligations, specifically the Berne Convention for the Pro-
tection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”) and the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS”).44
The United States acceded to the Berne Convention in 1988.45
It requires parties to the treaty to treat the copyrighted work of other
members as they would the works of their own nationals.46  Article 11
of the Berne Convention gives authors of dramatic, dramatic-musical,
and musical works the exclusive right to authorize the public perform-
ance of their works.47  Article 11bis(1) specifies that authors have the
exclusive right to authorize the broadcasting, rebroadcasting, and pub-
lic communication by loudspeaker or analogous instrument of their
works to the public.48  Article 11bis(2) permits countries to determine
the conditions under which Art 11bis(1) may be enforced, as long as the
enforcement regime does not prevent authors from obtaining equitable
remuneration.49  Article 11bis(2) is interpreted to mean that countries
may implement compulsory licensing regimes as long as they provide
copyright owners with compensation.50
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (last revised at Paris on July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne
Convention].  Dawn M. Larsen, Note: The Effect of the Berne Implementation Act of
1988 on Copyright Protection for Architectural Structures. 1990 U. ILL. L. REV.
151, 152 (1990).
46 Berne Convention, supra note 45, at 233.
47 Id. at 241.
48 Id. at 241, 243.
49 Id. at 243.
50 World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Guide to the Copyright and
Related Rights Treaties Administered by WIPO and Glossary of Copyright and Re-
lated Rights Terms, at 79, BC-11bis. 22 (2003).
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TRIPS is a WTO treaty, and as such all members of the WTO
must accede to it.51  It requires member states to comply with the
Berne Convention.52  Members are allowed to limit and provide excep-
tions to rights granted as long as these exceptions are limited in na-
ture and do not “conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right
holder.”53  During the same hearings at which  performing rights orga-
nizations and restaurant owners testified, the U.S. Copyright Office
expressed concern that the proposed FMLA would violate U.S. inter-
national copyright commitments.54  Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights, noted that an exemption as broad as the one proposed in
Section 110(5)(B) appears to fall “outside the scope of the permissible
‘small exceptions’” permitted under both the Berne Convention and
TRIPS.55  Bruce A. Lehman, then Assistant Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks, testified that the United States joined the Berne
Convention with the understanding that the Section 110(5) Homestyle
Exemption was a de minimis exemption, and to subsequently enlarge
the scope of the exemption would cause U.S. trading partners to claim
a violation of international commitments.56  Included in the Senate
Congressional Record was a letter from Deputy U.S. Trade Represen-
tative Richard W. Fisher to Representative Mary Bono.57  In it, he
noted that the European Union had already expressed “significant
concern about the pending legislation” and had threatened to bring
dispute settlement proceedings in the WTO to challenge the existing
Homestyle Exemption.58  Adding the more expansive business exemp-
tion would only add fuel to the growing outrage over U.S.
exemptions.59
51 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994
1869 U. N. T. S. 299, 301 [hereinafter TRIPS].
52 Id. at 301.
53 Id. at 305.
54 Music Licensing in Restaurants and Retail and Other Establishments: Hearing
on H.R. 789 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, 106th Cong.
74 (1997) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, Copyright Office
of the United States, Library of Congress), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/
committees/judiciary/hju43667.000/hju43667_0f.htm.
55 Id. at 43.
56 Id. (statement of Bruce Lehman, Assistant Comm’r of Commerce).
57 Music Licensing in Restaurants and Retail and Other Establishments: Hearing
on H.R. 789 Before the Subcomm. On Courts and Intellectual Prop., 106th Cong. 74
(1997) (letter from Richard Fisher, Deputy Trade Representative).
58 Id.
59 Id.
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B. World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Understanding
160
Despite admonishments from various experts, Congress passed
the FMLA and thus enacted the Business Exemption in Section
110(5)(B) and the newly tailored Homestyle Exemption in Section
110(5)(A).  In January of 1999, the European Communities (“EC”) re-
quested consultations with the United States regarding Section 110(5)
of the FMLA under Article 4 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Under-
standing and Article 64.1 of TRIPS.60  Consultations were held in
March of 1999, but the parties failed to reach a mutually acceptable
agreement.61  The EC requested an examining panel under Dispute
Settlement Understanding Article 6 and TRIPS Article 64.1.62  The EC
alleged that the exemptions provided in Section 110(5)(A) and (B) vio-
lated U.S. obligations under TRIPS, and requested that the Panel: (1)
find that the United States had violated  Article 9.1 of TRIPS and Arti-
cles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention, and (2) recom-
mend that the United States bring its domestic legislation into
conformity with its international obligations.63  The United States
countered that its legislation complied fully with both Article 13 of
TRIPS and the substantive requirements of the Berne Convention.64
The panel submitted its report in June of 2000.  It found that
the Section 110(5)(A) Homestyle Exemption satisfied Article 13 of
TRIPS (minor exemptions) and was thus consistent with Berne Con-
ventions obligations.65  However, it found that the Section 110(5)(B)
Business Exemption did not meet Article 13  requirements, and was,
therefore, inconsistent with Berne Convention obligations.66  The
Panel’s decision focused on the TRIPS Article 13 test that requires
that exemptions: (1) be confined to certain special cases, (2) do not con-
flict with the legitimate interests of the right holder, and (3) do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.67
The Panel found Section 110(5)(A) met the Article 13 requirements,
because the exemptions were sufficiently limited68 and dramatic musi-
cal right holders would not expect to license or receive compensation
60 Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, ¶ 1.1, WT/
DS160 (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter Section 110(5) Case].
61 Id. ¶ 1.2.
62 Id.
63 Id. ¶ 6.1.
64 Id. ¶ 6.2.
65 Id. ¶ 7.1.
66 Id.
67 TRIPS, supra note 51, at art. 13.
68 Section 110(5) Case, supra note 60, ¶¶6.143, 7.1.
\\server05\productn\R\RGL\9-2\RGL202.txt unknown Seq: 10 16-APR-10 10:39
176 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 9:2
from the performances in question.69  The Panel found Section
110(5)(B) did not meet the criteria because the number of businesses it
included was too large,70 right holders of musical works would be in a
position to authorize secondary broadcasts and receive compensa-
tion,71 and the United States failed to prove that the exemption did not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.72
In July of 2000, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”)
adopted the Panel’s report, and in August, the United States informed
the DSB that it would require a “reasonable period of time” to imple-
ment the recommendations and rulings, as permitted under Dispute
Settlement Understanding Article 21.3.73  After the parties failed to
agree on the definition of a “reasonable period of time,” the EC re-
quested binding arbitration to determine the implementation period.74
The United States argued for an implementation between fifteen and
seventeen months, ending on December 31, 2001,75 while the EC
maintained a reasonable period of time was ten months.76  The arbiter
found a reasonable time period was twelve months from the adoption
of the Panel’s report (July 27, 2000),77 making the deadline for imple-
mentation July 27, 2001.
With the implementation deadline quickly approaching and no
sign of U.S. legislative compliance, the EC and the United States
struck a deal giving the United States until December 31, 2001 to
make the required changes in exchange for participation in a binding
arbitration to determine the level of nullification and impairment of
benefits to the EC as a result of Section 110(5)B.78  Should the United
States fail to make the required changes by the new, extended dead-
69 Id. ¶¶ 6.218, 6.271.
70 Id. ¶ 6.133.
71 Id. ¶ 6.210.
72 Id. ¶ 6.265.
73 World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement: DSU 160 United States - Sec-
tion 110(5) of the Copyright Act, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
cases_e/ds160_e.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2010). See generally Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal In-
struments-Results of the Uruguay Round art. 21.3, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
74 World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement: DS 160 United States - Section
110(5) of the Copyright Act, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/
ds160_e.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2010).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Intellectual Property: EU Blasts WTO Arbitration Award in Music Licensing
Dispute with U.S., Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law Daily (BNA), at D-2 (Nov.
26, 2001).
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line, the EC was entitled to claim against the United States the
amount of nullification and impairment determined by the arbitration
panel.79  The arbitration request was the first of its kind under Article
25.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.80
The financial compensation arbitration was important because
there was a large discrepancy between the figures submitted by the
United States and those submitted by the EC.  The United States
claimed annual losses from the legislation were approximately
US$446,000-$733,000,81 while the EC claimed losses of approximately
US$25 million.82  The discrepancy was a result of different methods of
calculation.  The EC argued that the proper method of calculation was
one that assumed all establishments using copyrighted works of EC
right holders were licensed.83  The United States argued for a de facto
approach where damage was measured by determining the difference
between the amount EC right holders were receiving before the
amendment and the amount they received after the amendment.84
The arbiters agreed with the United States that the level of compensa-
tion should equal the amount of licensing revenue that the EC could
reasonably expect to receive.85  The Panel determined that: (1) royal-
ties should be calculated based on the amount paid by U.S. performing
rights organizations to EC right holders as opposed to the amount col-
lected by U.S. performing rights organizations,86 (2) nullification and
impairment should be assessed from the date the matter was referred
to the Panel, in this case approximately June 30, 2001,87  and (3) as a
result of Section 110(5)(B) was US$1.1 million per year.88
January 2002 came and went without changes in U.S. legisla-
tion.89  The EC proposed retaliation by levying a special fee on U.S.
nationals in connection with border measures concerning copyrighted
79 Id.
80 Trade: WTO Chief Moore Appoints Arbitrators in Music Licensing Decision
Against U.S., Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law Daily (BNA), at D-5 (Aug. 13,
2001).
81 Award of the Arbitrators, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act
¶ 4.3, WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001).
82 Id. at ¶ 4.2.
83 Id. ¶ 3.4.
84 Id. ¶ 3.5.
85 Id. ¶ 3.33.
86 Id. ¶ 3.58.
87 Id. ¶ 4.24.
88 Id. ¶ 4.73.
89 European Trade Commission, WTO Dispute Settlement, Cases Involving the
EU, Recourse by the European Communities to Article 22.2 of the DSU, Jan. 11,
2002, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114288.pdf (last
visited Feb. 20, 2010).
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goods in the amount of US$1.05 million per year.90  The United States
objected to this method of retaliation, claiming it did not conform to
Dispute Settlement Understanding Articles 22.6 and 22.3, and called
for arbitration.91  The EC agreed to give the United States more time
to implement the required changes in exchange for a suspension of the
arbitration proceeding.92
In June 2003, the EC and United States reached an agreement
where the United States paid US$3.3 million into a fund for the pro-
motion of authors’ rights and assistance to EU performing rights orga-
nizations.93  The payments were to be backdated to December 2001 to
cover a three year period of U.S. legislative non-compliance.94  The set-
tlement was contingent upon the understanding that Section 110(5)(B)
was to be amended by the end of 2004.95
Dispute Settlement Understanding Article 21.6 requires
adopted recommendations and rulings issued by WTO panels to be
kept under surveillance until they are resolved.96  Accordingly, the
United States issues monthly updates communicating its progress to-
ward implementation of the required legislative changes.  Unfortu-
nately, since the agreement in 2003, the updates have had little to
90 Id.  See EU, Japan Agree to Give U.S. More Time to Comply with Copyright
Ruling, Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law Daily (BNA), at D-3 (Jan. 22, 2002).
91 European Trade Commission, WTO Dispute Settlement, Cases Involving the
EU, Request for Arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU, Jan. 18, 2003, http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114298.pdf (last visited Feb.
20, 2010).
92 EU, Japan Agree to Give U.S. More Time to Comply with Copyright Ruling,
Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law Daily (BNA), at D-3 (Jan. 22, 2002).
93 European Trade Commission, WTO Dispute Settlement, Cases Involving the
EU, Notification of Mutually Satisfactory Temporary Agreement, 26 June 2003,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114303.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2010). See U.S. to Pay $3.3 Million to EU Music Groups in Tempo-
rary Settlement of Licensing Dispute, Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law Daily
(BNA), at D-8 (June 25, 2003).
94 European Trade Commission, WTO Dispute Settlement, Cases Involving the
EU, Notification of Mutually Satisfactory Temporary Agreement, 26 June 2003,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114303.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2010).
95  See U.S. to Pay $3.3 Million to EU Music Groups in Temporary Settlement of
Licensing Dispute, Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law Daily (BNA), at D-8 (June
25, 2003).
96 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, Legal Instruments–Results of the Uruguay Round art. 21.6, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
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offer in the way of substantive progress.97  Each of the sixty updates
state, “The U.S. Administration has been working closely with the
U.S. Congress, and will continue to confer with the European Commu-
nities, in order to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of this mat-
ter.”98  Communication with the U.S. Trade Representative’s legal
staff in charge of DSU 160 provided no further information than that
provided in the official Art. 21.6 updates.99  The most recent U.S. re-
port to the DSB on December 21, 2009, provided no new updates.100
The lack of progress toward amending Section 110(5)(B) cannot be at-
tributed to U.S. congressional resistance to addressing copyright legis-
lation because there have been many proposed amendments to U.S.
copyright law, including one to Section 110(5)(C) in February of
2008,101 but none that would remedy the problems identified in DSU
160.
From the information above, one can draw several conclusions.
First, the United States has not amended Section 110(5)(B) for undis-
closed reasons and shows no sign of political progress toward a solu-
tion.  In fact, when Representative Sensenbrenner, a sponsor of the
FMLA, heard of the original panel’s decision, his spokesperson said
the FMLA “is U.S. law, and allowing an international body to say, ‘You
will change the law,’ is not a good precedent to set.”102  After nine
years (2001–2010), presumably lack of time is no longer the issue.  Sec-
ond, the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding provides for two
remedies in the case of non-compliance—trade retaliation and trade
concessions103—neither of which have been used in the nine years of
non-compliance.  At one point, the EC threatened trade retaliation,
but it quickly backed down.  The United States has not offered, nor the
EC demanded, trade concessions.  This leads to the conclusion that the
97 See, e.g., European Commission Trade, WTO Dispute Settlement, Cases Involv-
ing the EU, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/wtodispute/show.cfm?id=155&code=1; see,
e.g.  World Trade Organization, Status Report Regarding Implementation of the
DSB Recommendations and Rulings in the Dispute, United States Section 110(5)
of the US Copyright Act (WT/DS160).
98 See  e.g., European Commission Trade, WTO Dispute Settlement, Cases Involv-
ing the EU, Status Report by the United States, Dec. 7, 2004, http://trade.ec.
europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/december/tradoc_120595.pdf (last visited Feb. 20,
2010).
99 E-mail from Probir Mehta, U.S. Trade Representative Attorney in charge of
DSU 160, to author (Dec. 2, 2009) (on file with author).
100 Statements by the U.S. at the Dec. 21, 2009 DSB Meeting, http://geneva.
usmission.gov/2009/12/21/1221dsb/.
101 S. 2591, 110th Cong. §1 (2008).
102 Anne Hiaring, Fish or Fowl? The Nature of WTO Dispute Resolution Under
TRIPS, 12 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP.  L. 269, 282–83 (2006).
103 DSU, supra note 96, at art. 22.1.
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remedies are, in some way, ineffective or inappropriate for the current
situation.  Third, the parties agreed upon and exchanged financial
compensation as temporary remedy to the dispute, which indicates
they found it to be an effective temporary remedy.  Finally, without
progress toward a solution, DSU 160 is creating a precedent of non-
compliance that threatens the integrity of the WTO system.
III. WTO TRADE REMEDIES AND THE FINANCIAL
COMPENSATION MODEL
A. Current Remedies Available Under the WTO System
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body was established to settle
disputes that arise when a country adopts a trade measure or takes
some action that one or more fellow WTO members considers a viola-
tion of the WTO agreements, or when a member fails to live up to its
international obligations.104  If a member state fails to abide by the
decision of the DSB, the winning party has two options to attempt to
force compliance.  The first option is trade retaliation where the win-
ning country withdraws certain concessions in the amount equal to the
damage caused by the original breach.105  The second option is trade
concessions; here, the losing country compensates the winning country
with additional concessions equal to the original breach.106
Financial compensation, such as that type paid by the United
States to the EC in DSU 160, is not explicitly available as a remedy
and DSU 160 was the first time financial compensation was used to
temporarily resolve a dispute.107  The financial compensation in DSU
160 was for only part of the period of non-compliance, differentiating it
from the other trade remedies that last until there is compliance.
Therefore, whether financial compensation has been successfully read
into Article 22 is ambiguous and uncertain.  The idea of financial com-
pensation is not new and has been supported by developing countries
since 1965, more recently by various countries calling for DSU
reform.108
104 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes A
Unique Contribution, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.
htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2010).
105 DSU, supra note 96, at art. 22.
106 Id.
107 Pei-kan Yang, Some Thought on a Feasible Operation of Monetary Compensa-
tion as an Alternative to Current Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement, 3 ASIAN
J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 423, 432–33 (2008); see also Joel. P.
Trachtman, The WTO Cathedral, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 127, 162 (2007) (“The Ba-
nanas case may have been settled informally between Ecuador and the European
Communities through cash consideration.”).
108 Yang, supra note 107, at 447; Trachtman, supra note 107, at 145.
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There are various models that propose financial compensation
as a remedy.  In their article Financial Compensation in the WTO: Im-
proving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement,109 Marco Bronckers
and Naboth van den Broek present a well-developed and comprehen-
sive model that addresses the major benefits and difficulties associ-
ated with financial compensation.  Using this model as a rubric, the
following section will hypothesize that had financial compensation
been available to the parties in DSU 160, it would have provided an
expedient and satisfactory remedy for both parties and would have
prevented the extended period of non-compliance that poses a threat to
the integrity of the WTO system.
B. Financial Compensation Model
The Bronckers and van den Broek financial compensation
model is based upon a proposed amendment to the WTO’s Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding, rather than a new interpretation of the cur-
rent agreement.110  The proposed amendment would provide a
member whose rights were infringed with a choice of remedies—trade
concessions, trade retaliation, or financial compensation.111  The
amount of financial compensation would be assessed by a panel, and
either backdated to the beginning of the infringement for clear or “bad
faith” breaches, or, in more ambiguous cases, begin following the find-
ing by a panel or the WTO Appellate Body.112  Compensation would be
restorative and not punitive in nature, though the model would allow
for minor annual increases in the amount of damages due to reflect the
increasing cost of non-compliance to those harmed by the measure, as
well as to the WTO system itself.113  Finally, Bronckers and van den
Broek suggest that individual WTO members must have sovereign dis-
cretion to distribute compensation payments to their domestic private
parties that suffered from the breach.114
The model proposes a liquidated damages formula that would
dictate pre-set standard sums for various types of violations.115  These
pre-determined amounts could be linked to the size of the defending
member’s economy and assets so that effect of the compensation would
109 Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek, Financial Compensation in the
WTO: Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 101
(2005).
110 Id. at 123–25.
111 Id. at 107.
112 Id. at 124–25.
113 Id. at 124.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 125.
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be proportional, regardless of the country’s economic size.116  Estab-
lishing pre-set standard sums is a way to circumvent the problem of
calculating damages, which can be done in many ways and thus could
be a source of controversy.117  In DSU 160, the parties, with the help of
an arbitration panel, were able to agree on the amount of financial
compensation,118 though had pre-set sums been available they may
have saved significant arbitration costs.  The Bronckers and van den
Broek model includes special allowances for developing countries, or
those with smaller economies, that would allow them to claim finan-
cial compensation without having it claimed against them.119  It also
suggests that larger or richer developing countries might be entitled to
an “opt- out” clause that would exempt them from the system of finan-
cial compensation.120
IV. DSU 160 – THE CASE FOR FINANCIAL COMPENSATION
A. Embodying the Benefits
The following section examines how DSU 160 embodies the
benefits of financial compensation identified in the Bronckers and van
den Broek model.  A summary of each argument presented by Bronck-
ers and van den Broek will be presented, followed by an application of
the argument to DSU 160.
1. Financial Compensation is not trade restrictive.121
Currently, when a member does not comply with a Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding, the member that suffered injury has two po-
tential remedies—trade retaliation and trade concessions.122  Trade
retaliation is restrictive because new restrictions on importation hurt
domestic consumers and industries that rely on the now-limited im-
ports.123  Trade concessions do not restrict trade, per se, but can cause
distortions to the negotiated trading system.124  Retaliation and con-
cessions can ‘infect’ innocent bystanders, who have their trading posi-
116 Id.
117 See Award of the Arbitrators, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright
Act ¶ 4.2, WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001), available at www.worldtrade-
law.net/reports/25awards/us-copyright(25).pdf.
118 Id.
119 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 109, at 125.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 110.
122 DSU, supra note 96, at art. 22.
123 Arwel Davies, Reviewing Dispute Settlement at the World Trade Organization:
a time to Reconsider the Role/s of Compensation?, 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 31, 34
(2006).
124 Id. at 38.
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tions altered by the remedy.  With financial compensation, the breach
is isolated to the parties involved and has few ramifications for the
trading positions of other domestic parties or third parties.  In a sense,
the breach is quarantined and kept non-contagious until it is cured
through compliance.
In DSU 160, the EC threatened to retaliate against U.S. non-
compliance by implementing new measures on imported copyrighted
goods.125  The threat of retaliation was enough to spur a new agree-
ment between the parties as to temporary compensation, demonstrat-
ing the extent to which the parties wanted to avoid retaliation in favor
of a different remedy.126
2. Financial compensation helps redress injury.127
Financial compensation can provide at least partial reparation
for damages caused by the WTO-illegal act.128  In DSU 160, the arbi-
tration panel identified the amount of income that European perform-
ing rights organizations did not receive as a result of the FMLA.129
The amount paid by the United States to the EC could have gone to
performing rights organizations to compensate the rights holders who
were directly harmed by the U.S. breach, and thus redressed their in-
jury.  However, the EC chose to use the funds for different purposes.130
3. In most cases, financial compensation will work as well, and
sometimes better, to induce compliance.131
There are two aspects of compliance within the WTO system.
The first aspect is compliance with the positive and negative aspects of
the treaty obligations assumed by member states when they join the
125 European Trade Commission, WTO Dispute Settlement, Cases Involving the
EU, Recourse by the European Communities to Article 22.2 of the DSU, Jan. 11,
2002, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114288.pdf (last
visited Feb. 20, 2010).
126 See EU, Japan Agree to Give U.S. More Time to Comply with Copyright Ruling,
Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law Daily (BNA), at D-3 (Jan. 22, 2002); U.S. to
Pay $3.3 Million to EU Music Groups in Temporary Settlement of Licensing Dis-
pute, Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law Daily (BNA), at D-8 (June 25, 2003).
127 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 109, at 110.
128 Davies, supra note 123, at 40.
129 U.S. to Pay $3.3 Million to EU Music Groups in Temporary Settlement of Li-
censing Dispute, Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law Daily (BNA), at D-8 (June
15, 2003).
130 Id.
131 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 109, at 110.
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WTO.132  The United States was found to be non-complaint with its
TRIPS obligations when it passed the FMLA and remains non-compli-
ant today.133  A secondary aspect is compliance within the remedy sys-
tem.  The language of the Dispute Settlement Understanding indicates
that parties to a dispute should either be in the process of implement-
ing the panel’s recommendations,134 or be pursuing trade retaliation
or trade concessions.135  If a country is neither actively pursuing com-
pliance nor using one of the trade remedies, it is undermining the
WTO trading system.  Allowing a country to exist in a state of unsanc-
tioned non-compliance sets a precedent that WTO obligations may be
ignored.  Therefore, it should be a goal of the WTO system to avoid
such rogue situations.136
In DSU 160, compliance with the DSU recommendations will
be very difficult.  Compliance would involve amending the FMLA, a
difficult proposition considering the political bargaining that went into
its passage.137  Without amending the FMLA, there is no legislative
132 World Trade Organization, Principles of the trading system: Predictability
through binding and transparency, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Feb. 24 2010).
133 Albena P. Petrova, The U.S. – Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act Dispute Anal-
ysis and Forecasts for Compliance, 15 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 43, 45–47
(2006).
134 DSU, supra note 96, at art. 21.1 (“Prompt compliance with recommendations
or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of
disputes.”).
135 Id. at art. 22.2 (“If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to
be inconsistent with a covered agreement into compliance therewith or otherwise
comply with the recommendations and rulings within the reasonable period of
time determined pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 21, such Member shall, if so
requested, and no later than the expiry of the reasonable period of time, enter into
negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures,
with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation.”).
136 International law must often address the argument that “real law” requires a
sovereign to enforce it and therefore international law is not “real law.” MARK W.
JANIS & RICHARD S. KAY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, xl (Univ. of Connecticut
Foundation Press) (1990).  Janis and Kay, citing Max Weber, define “law” as an
order system endowed with certain specific guarantees of the probability of its em-
pirical validity. Id. Weber wrote of a “coercive appartus, i.e., that there are one or
more persons whose special task it is to hold themselves ready to apply specially
provided mean of coercion (legal coercion) for the purpose of norm enforcement.”
Id. at  xli.  To be an effective and coherent legal system, the WTO must provide
“certain specific guarantees of the probability of its empirical validity.”  Instances
in which members are neither in compliance with international obligations nor in
compliance with trade remedies, undermine the specific guarantees of validity
that make the WTO an efficacious legal system.
137 See supra notes 39–42.
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basis for the United States to collect royalties from commercial estab-
lishments.  The more realistic option is to use a trade remedy to com-
pensate the right holders who would otherwise receive royalties.  As
discussed above, the fact that trade retaliation or trade concessions
have not been used indicates that the remedies are in some way inef-
fective or inappropriate for the situation.  On the other hand, DSU 160
demonstrates that financial compensation can provide an alternative
remedy and thus a way to remain a way for the breaching country to
remain a compliant member of the WTO system.
4. Financial compensation does not lead to disproportionate burden
on innocent bystanders.138
As discussed above, trade retaliation and concessions impose
costs upon private parties who were previously external to the dispute.
Externalizing the costs of trade remedies is unfair in many respects
and may cause domestic turmoil.139  Financial compensation, on the
other hand, would be an obligation that could be distributed over the
offending country’s budget, and thus not impose specific costs on spe-
cific, innocent bystanders.140  In DSU 160, the financial compensation
issued from the U.S. government’s coffers and not from trade distor-
tions applied to private parties.141
5. Financial compensation can be a disincentive to foot-dragging.142
Allowing financial compensation as a remedy prevents coun-
tries from delaying the dispute settlement process, especially if dam-
ages are assessed retroactively.143  If damages are assessed from the
beginning of infringement, countries have an easily measurable incen-
tive to come into compliance as soon as possible.144  Financial compen-
sation is an efficient remedy that imposes few procedural costs once it
has been calculated, while traditional remedies involve additional cal-
culations.145  As trade volumes are not static, trade retaliation and
138 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 109, at 110.
139 Davies, supra note 123, at 44.
140 Id.
141 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. No.
108–11, 117 Stat. 559 (2003).
142 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 109, at 110.
143 Id. at 110–11.
144 Davies, supra note 123 at 40.
145 See Robert Howse & Robert W. Staiger, United States-Anti-Dumping Act of
1916 (Original Complaint by the European Communities)- Recourse to Arbitration
by the United States Under 22.6 of the DSU, WTREV 2005, 4(2), 295–316, 302.
(Outlining the three-step analysis to be used to determine the level of nullification
or impairment caused by the measure introduced by the defendant.  In the case of
financial compensation, the analysis would be complete after this step.  With
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trade concessions measures must be monitored and re-calculated to
ensure that the remedy is proportional to the breach.146  The third
round of arbitration in DSU 160 began because the United States ar-
gued that retaliatory measures used by the EC were in excess of the
determined harm, though the amount of nullification and impairment
had already been determined through arbitration.147  Financial com-
pensation is much simpler and easy to execute than trade retaliation
or trade concessions.
In DSU 160, the parties agreed to financial compensation in a
relatively expedient manner, at least in comparison to the period of
non-compliance.  Were financial compensation an acceptable remedy,
the parties could effectively exchange money and move on without
costing each other, or the system, any more than was necessary.
6. Financial compensation is in line with general public
international law.148
The principles of public international law call for two reactions
to breaches of treaty obligations: (1) compliance and (2) reparation for
remedial purposes.149  The traditional remedies address compliance
but do not provide for reparations to private entities.150  Financial
compensation could act as a “stick” to induce compliance, and a “car-
rot” to make those hurt by the breach, whole.
Here, perhaps the parties agreed to financial compensation be-
cause compliance seemed unrealistic, but financial compensation of-
fered the next best thing—reparations.  In some ways, financial
compensation can also achieve what WTO rule compliance seeks, mak-
ing the parties whole again.
traditional remedies, a second three-step analysis would be needed to determine
the trade impact of the complaintant’s proposed retaliatory measure.)  The figure
determined by the second three-step analysis would need to be monitored and oc-
casionally recalculated to ensure it remained proportional, per DSU article 22.4.
146 DSU, supra note 96, at art. 22.4.
147 European Trade Commission, WTO Dispute Settlement, Cases Involving the
EU, Request for Arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU, Jan. 18, 2003, http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114298.pdf (last visited Feb.
20, 2010).
148 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 109, at 111.
149 Id. See Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzo´w (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 17 (Judgment of Sept. 13) (International Court of Justice case estab-
lishing reparations as a remedy in international law).
150 Davies, supra note 123, at 48.  “[N]ullification or impairment was equated with
trade effects, which in turn refers to the total value of trade annually excluded.
This methodology distances the concept of nullification or impairment from how
the violation impacts upon private entities.” (in reference to several WTO Dispute
Settlements). Id.
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7. Introducing financial compensation adds an element of
fairness.151
According to Bronckers and van den Broek, “fairness” plays an
important role in explaining compliance with domestic and interna-
tional law.152  Most parties, especially the United States and EC, will
be on both sides of the WTO Dispute Settlement process, as both appli-
cants and defendants.153  In fact, the EC and the United States are the
most active TRIPS-related complainants to the WTO.154  They have an
interest in a system that has integrity and treats both applicants and
defendants equitably.  DSU 160 represents a situation where both par-
ties have agreed upon a remedy that they find fair, and, as demon-
strated above, this remedy is in line with the premise and goals of the
WTO system.
B. Addressing the Difficulties
The following section examines how DSU 160 addressed the
difficulties of financial compensation identified in the Bronckers and
van den Broek model.  A summary of each argument presented by
Bronckers and van den Broek will be presented, followed by an appli-
cation of the argument to DSU 160.
1. Monetary damages are too difficult to calculate.155
Critics are concerned that calculating the amount of financial
compensation would be too difficult and the results could differ dra-
matically.156  Bronckers and van den Broek suggest a liquidated dam-
ages model that would attach predetermined damages to specific
breaches.157  The amount of damages would increase every year that
non-compliance continues to reflect additional damages and the in-
creasing costs of non-compliance, but not enough to make the damages
punitive in nature.158
DSU 160 demonstrates that, at least in some cases, financial
compensation is not too difficult to calculate, nor is it too contentious
for parties to agree upon.  However, if there had been predetermined
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Robert E. Hudec, Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settle-
ment, in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES 369, 377 (Friedl Weis
ed., 2000).
154 Hiaring, supra note 102, at 278.
155 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 109, at 113.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 125.
158 Id. at 114.
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damages for this particular type of breach, the parties might have
saved the cost of the second arbitration panel.
2. Monetary damages are unenforceable.159
The enforceability of a particular remedy must be determined
in comparison to other remedies.  The first question, therefore, is
whether financial compensation works as a remedy; and second,
whether there are more effective alternatives.  In response to the ques-
tion of whether countries actually pay monetary damages, Bronckers
and van den Broek cite DSU 160, state-investor disputes in ICSID or
NAFTA, and claims paid by Iran and the United State to private inter-
ests on the basis of awards granted by the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal as examples of situations where governments did, in fact,
pay.160  Another way to assess whether a remedy is actually enforcea-
ble is to examine whether members are willing to use the remedy.
Professor Hudec says that all WTO governments are repeat players in
the game, and that most appear as both complainants and defend-
ants.161  Therefore, the optimum legal system is the one that will be
most helpful in enforcing one’s trade agreement rights as a complain-
ant, while at the same time preserving the desired degree of freedom
to deal with adverse legal rulings against one’s own behavior.162
Members will only participate in measures that will benefit them as
complainants and do not unduly hinder them as defendants.  Reme-
dies that are used by members, therefore, assume an implicit degree of
enforceability.
In DSU 160, the parties agreed to financial compensation as a
temporary remedy while officially pursuing compliance,163 though
nine years later there seems to be little if any progress toward a per-
manent solution.  The parties’ willingness to agree to compensation
covering a defined and retroactive period of non-compliance164 indi-
cates a willingness to use financial compensation as a remedy, and to
honor the obligations such a remedy creates.  The financial compensa-
tion agreement in DSU 160 was limited to, and not subsequently ex-
tended beyond, a three year period during which the United States
was to work towards compliance.165  The limited nature of the agree-
159 Id.
160 Id. at 115.
161 Hudec, supra note 153, at 377.
162 Id.
163 European Trade Commission, WTO Dispute Settlement, Cases Involving the
EU, Request for Arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU, Jan. 18, 2003, http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114298.pdf (last visited Feb.
20, 2010).
164 Id.
165 Id.
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ment does not detract from its ability to signal that members are re-
ceptive to putting financial compensation on the negotiating table, and
that should financial compensation become an official remedy, they
would honor their financial obligations.
In terms of comparative enforceability, trade retaliation does
not have barriers to enforcement but it does have serious side effects,
such as hurting innocent bystanders who were previously unaffected
by the breach.166  Trade concessions face similar barriers to enforce-
ment as financial compensation, namely, the offending country must
offer the remedy.167  In sum, financial compensation is on equal foot-
ing in terms of enforceability with trade compensation and though less
enforceable than trade retaliation, it has fewer negative side effects.
3. Financial compensation may not reach rightful recipients.168
Under the current structure of the WTO where the only enti-
ties with legal personality are member states,169 payment directly to
private parties is impossible.170  Member governments remain sover-
eign and any compensation must go to them, and, hopefully, distrib-
uted to parties injured by the breach.171  According to Bronckers and
van den Broek, experience shows that it is possible to tailor compensa-
tion mechanisms to compensate specific parties, even if there are a
great number of diverse parties.172  The logistical problem of paying
out money to large groups of people has been addressed in situations
like class action suits.173
Again, to rightfully ascertain the value of financial compensa-
tion, one must compare it to the alternatives.  Under trade retaliation
or compensation, private parties hurt by the trade breach have no
chance to recover the amount of nullification or impairment directly.
To reach the rightful recipients, compensation gained through trade
retaliation or trade concessions would have to be measured, mone-
tized, and collected from the trade beneficiaries (most likely not those
involved in the original breach) and redirected to parties harmed by
the breach.  Despite the obstacle to direct payments presented by gov-
ernments, financial compensation has a far better chance to reach the
rightful recipients than trade retaliation or trade compensation be-
166 Davies, supra note 123, at 34.
167 Id. at 38.
168 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 109, at 116.
169 With the exception of the European Communities, an entity that functions like
a sovereign state in the WTO context.  Yang, supra note 107, at 457.
170 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 109, at n. 25.
171 Id. at 116.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 116–17.
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cause financial compensation can be given directly to parties harmed
by the breach.
In DSU 160, the EC government chose not to compensate the
specific performing rights organizations that were hurt, but rather to
fund special programs.174  This decision was made at the discretion of
the EC; nevertheless, it provided the opportunity to use the money to
restore the private parties to their pre-breach positions.  Should finan-
cial compensation be allowed as an official remedy and were the EC to
receive annual payments from the United States, it is likely the per-
forming rights organizations would ask for their fair share.  This do-
mestic pressure from internal sources is another way to help ensure
the compensation reaches those it should.
4. Financial compensation is more acceptable for certain
measures.175
Some argue that financial compensation is more acceptable as
a remedy for certain kinds of illegal administrative measures than for
illegal legislative measures.176  One reason is that it might be harder
to identify the private parties adversely affected by legislative mea-
sures than by administrative measures.177  This distinction proves un-
convincing after DSU 160 where the breach was legislative and there
was no issue identifying the parties adversely affected.  The panel that
determined the amount of damages also indicated the DSB’s preferred
method of calculation—ascertaining the actual injury rather than the
potential injury.178  Further, the Bronckers and van den Broek model
suggests that financial compensation be offered as an alternative rem-
edy, meaning if parties felt it was unsuited for their needs they could
choose retaliation or trade compensation.179
5. Financial compensation has less compliance-inducing effect.180
Critics say that financial compensation will have less compli-
ance-inducing effect because the demonstrative nature of retaliation
174 U.S. to Pay $3.3 Million to EU Music Groups in Temporary Settlement of Li-
censing Dispute, Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law Daily (BNA), at D-8 (June
25, 2003).
175 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 109, at 117.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Award of the Arbitrators, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act
¶ 3.33, WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001).
179 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 109, at 117.
180 Id. at 117–18.
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sends a powerful message to the breaching government.181  Retalia-
tion often causes domestic industries to lobby for compliance so that
the retaliatory measures will end.  Financial compensation, on the
other hand, can be accomplished more quietly and without creating a
domestic lobby.  Bronckers and van den Broek, however, point out that
given the current financial climate, “It’s only money” is hardly a win-
ning slogan, and that financial compensation is only one choice among
three options.182  If a winning country wanted to make a statement via
its remedies, it would still have the opportunity to do so.
Critics in search of a compliance-inducing effect have not ac-
counted for situations where the winning party does not feel strongly
enough to invoke trade retaliation to make a statement and risk fur-
ther damage to its domestic industries, or for smaller countries for
whom retaliation is an ineffective measure.  In the end, the amount of
revenue lost to the performance rights societies in DSU 160 is propor-
tionately small, limited in scope, and ultimately not worthy of trade
retaliation.183  Absent a U.S. offer of trade compensation or the un-
likely event of legislative compliance, the case remains in blatant non-
compliance and threatens the integrity of the WTO legal system.184
Financial compensation offers a third, more muted, but still effective,
option.
181 R.E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, 199–200
(Butterworth, 2d ed. 1990).
182 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 109, at 117.
183 In 2001, ASCAP distributed $511 million in royalties to rights holders. Jim
Bessman, ASCAP Has Record Distribution In 2001, BILLBOARD BULLETIN, Feb. 7,
2002, http://www.allbusiness.com/retail-trade/miscellaneous-retail-retail-stores-
not/4364487-1.html.  Actual GESAC distributions for 2001 were unavailable, but
in 2001, the original complainant in DSU 160, the Irish Music Rights Organiza-
tion (IMRO), distributed C= 21million.  Irish Music Rights Organization, Directors
Report 2001, 9, available at http://www.imro.ie/docs/pdfs/Directors%27%20Report
%20&%20Financial%20Statements%202001.pdf.  IMRO is just one of 34 national
performing rights organizations that make up Groupment Europe´en des Socie´te´s
d’Auteurs et Compositeurs (GESAC), the organization that received the financial
compensation paid by the U.S. to the EC.  GESAC, Introduction, http://www.gesac.
org (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).  If each of the 34 domestic performing rights orga-
nizations distributed a similar amount, total GESAC distributions would have
been approximately C= 714 million.  The arbitration panel found total nullification
and impairment measures to be US$1.1 million per year, which was the
equivalent of .15% of GESAC distributions, indicating the relative insignificance of
the nullification or impairment to the GESAC budget.
184 See supra note 136.
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6. Financial compensation does not change the asymmetry that
exists between large and small developed and developing
countries.185
Inequity between large and small, developed and developing
countries is a characteristic that plagues the WTO dispute settlement
system in general.186  Small, developing countries have less power to
pressure larger countries into compliance.187  It is true that financial
compensation would do little to change this dynamic.188  On the other
hand, financial compensation has the ability to make smaller develop-
ing countries whole, and to restore both the country and the private
parties to their pre-breach positions while waiting for the longer term
goal of compliance.189  Retaliation cannot make parties whole, and
trade concessions might restore a country to its net position, but it still
creates winners and losers.  Further, if a small, developing country can
only rely upon retaliation in the case of non-compliance, it may deter-
mine that the expense of bringing the dispute is not worth the poten-
tial gain.190  A member’s failure to use prescribed remedies is a loss to
the WTO system as a whole as it allows breaches to persist unad-
dressed.  Admittedly, DSU 160 was between two large and powerful
entities, the United States and the EC, but it nonetheless demon-
strates how financial compensation might replace trade revenue lost
because of the breach.
7. Financial compensation allows rich countries to buy themselves
out of violations.191
One objection is that larger countries with deep pockets will be
able to buy themselves the freedom to breach while smaller nations
will be stuck either following the rules or using one of the more cum-
185 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 109, at 118.
186 Davies, supra note 123, at 34.
187 Id.
188 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 109, at 118.
189 Id.
190 Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing - Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries: Proposals on
DSU by Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania and Zimbabwe, Working Documents of the DSU Negotiations, TN/DS/
W/19, Oct. 9, 2002, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
dispu_e.htm#dsb (“The economic cost of withdrawal of concessions in the goods
sector would have a greater adverse impact on the complaining developing-country
Member than on the defaulting developed-country Member and would only further
deepen the imbalance in their trade relations already seriously injured by the nul-
lification and impairment benefits.”).
191 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 109, at 118–19.
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bersome remedies.192  This contention is based on the assumption that
a country will hand over a lump sum and be on its way, much like
paying a traffic fine.193  Financial compensation, like retaliation,
would not be a substitute for ultimate compliance, nor would the com-
pensation be a one time payment—it would last as long as the
breach.194  According to the Broeckers and van den Broek model, the
amount due could increase on a yearly basis to reflect the increasing
cost of non-compliance.195  The charge that rich countries can use their
deep pockets to achieve impunity from WTO rules ignores or underes-
timates the ongoing nature of compensation due and the fact that it
will remain a stop-gap measure until compliance is achieved.  Bronck-
ers and van den Broek also suggest adjusted schemes for developing
countries where they either only receive and not pay compensation or
pay according to their abilities.196
The concern that developed countries will buy themselves the
freedom to breach also addresses notions of efficient breach, a discus-
sion articulated by Schwartz and Sykes.197  They first argue that the
language used in the Dispute Settlement Understanding in reference
to compliance is relatively weak.198  They next address Article 22.8 of
the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which requires that trade
remedies be temporary and that the Dispute Settlement Body monitor
implementation of adopted recommendations until the member
achieves full compliance.199  Schwartz and Sykes argue that Art. 22.8
could be interpreted to mean that remedies should be monitored to en-
sure the proper calibration of the remedy used, that continued public-
ity and oversight may serve to alert other members of a harm for
which they might seek compensation, or that the ongoing oversight
192 Id. at 118.
193 Yang, supra note 107, at 442 (“The proposal of monetary compensation bears
no attempt to be the ultimate one-off payment to buy out the defending Member’s
obligations imposed by the DSB.”).
194 Id.
195 Id. at 124.
196 Id. at 118.  Though Bronckers and van den Broek later state: “developed coun-
tries are unlikely to accept that they would have to pay financial compensation to
all developing countries, without having the right to claim financial compensation
from any one of them.” Id. at 120.
197 Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegoti-
ation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
179 (2002).
198 Id. at 190 (“The statement in the first passage that compliance is “preferred” is
weak- it does not say that compliance is mandatory, and it seems to us that this
provision does not exclude the possibility that noncompliance may in some cases
be acceptable.”).
199 DSU, supra note 96, at art. 22.8.
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“serves to check periodically on whether the impasse that led to com-
pensation or retaliation may have lifted.”200  Finally, they argue that
the Dispute Settlement Understanding text, taken as a whole, “al-
low[s] a violator to continue a violation in perpetuity, as long as it com-
pensates or is willing to bear the costs of the retaliatory suspension of
concessions” and that if full compliance were the mandatory and abso-
lute goal, WTO members could impose greater penalty for noncompli-
ance, such as punitive measures.201
A dispute settlement system based solely on the principles of
efficient breach would be contrary to the WTO goal of “entering into
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the
substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade rela-
tions.”202  Schwartz and Sykes “do not dispute that a ‘preference’ for
compliance seems implicit in the system.”203  However, current trade
remedies, as articulated by Dispute Settlement Understanding art.
22.1, recognize that full compliance with recommendations may not be
efficient or practical for members and allow them to address their
breach through trade remedies without sacrificing the ultimate goal of
compliance.204  Financial compensation would be an analogous remedy
that could increase the efficiency of the remedy without sacrificing the
ultimate goal of compliance.
8. Payments of financial compensation could violate Most Favored
Nation status or amount to an illegal subsidy.205
Most Favored Nation (“MFN”) status, as embodied in TRIPS,
says that any advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity granted by one
WTO member to nationals of any other country shall be immediately
and unconditionally extended to the nationals of all other members.206
The concern is that if one member gives financial compensation to an-
other member, this will constitute an advantage, favor, or privilege
such that it should be extended to all members.
Such concerns about MFN status are rebutted, using the
Bronckers van den Boek model, on two grounds: (1) financial compen-
sation does not constitute an advantage, favor, privilege or immunity
200 Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 197, at 190–91.
201 Id.
202 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Preamble,
Legal Instruments- Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) available
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm.
203 Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 197, at 190–91
204 See DSU, supra note 96, at arts. 22.1, 22.8.
205 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 109, at 119.
206 TRIPS, supra note 51, at art. 4.
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and (2) the proposal is based upon an amendment to the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding that would identify and address any incon-
sistencies such as differing treatment for developing countries.207  On
the first ground, financial compensation that makes one party whole
does not have the same features as a measure that would violate MFN
status.208  The winning country is merely restored to the economic po-
sition to which it is entitled; it receives nothing in excess.  For similar
reasons, financial compensation does not amount to an illegal
subsidy.209
Any country that successfully argues it was injured because of
the breach, is entitled to compensation.210  If compensation is received
by trade retaliation or trade concessions, the potential distortions to
the WTO trading regime could spiral as more and more countries alter
their trading positions.  Contrastingly, with financial compensation,
breaches are dealt with outside trade obligations, minimizing distor-
tions to the system.  In addition, successive complainants may save on
the cost of litigation by either bringing a case together, or “piggy-back-
ing” on the elements demonstrated in the first case.211
There are several countries outside the EC that have shown
particular interest in DSU 160.212  It is interesting to note that they
have not, as of yet, taken similar action against the United States for
similar breaches.  One reason is that, the amount of music represented
by non-U.S. and non-EC performing rights organizations and played
on U.S. radio and television is small.  A second reason is that the case
is currently in a state of limbo, and it does not make sense to initiate
further action when the result is unclear.  Should DSU 160 be resolved
and there be right holders with demonstrable damages claims against
the United States, the path to financial compensation would be
straightforward and attainable.213  Should other countries piggy-back
on the EC claims, the amount due from the United States to other
207 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 109, at 119.
208 See Davies, supra note 123, at 45.
209 Id. at 119–20.
210 Id.
211 Joel P. Trachtman, The WTO Cathedral, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 127, 161 (2007)
(“[B]arriers include the cost of litigation.  The cost of litigation can be reduced by
arrangements by which smaller economies arrange to work together, sharing the
costs. . . a move to cash remedies might induce more states to join in litigation,
perhaps establishing a practice of engaging in ‘class actions’.”).
212 Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, and Switzerland were all involved in the
original panel decision.
213 Trachtman, supra note 211 at 142.  (“[A]fter one state brings a successful dis-
pute settlement case, other states may follow on through formal dispute settle-
ment, avoiding the problem of uncertainty as to eventual success.”).
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members would increase and could increase the urgency of legislative
compliance.
9. Developing countries cannot afford financial compensation.214
The inability of developing countries to pay financial compen-
sation is a legitimate concern under the Bronckers and van den Broek
model.215  They suggest permitting developing countries to have a spe-
cial defense against financial compensation, based upon economic dif-
ficulties, or cap the amounts for which developing countries could be
liable.216  In this way, financial compensation could be seen as giving
developing countries an added tool to enforce decisions in their favor,
while also protecting them from reciprocal obligations.  Such an ad-
vantage could help balance the systemic inequities faced by developing
countries.217  Bronckers and van den Broek point out that developed
countries are unlikely to agree to a system in which all developing
countries may receive financial compensation but are not obligated to
pay it.218  Limits could be put on the system, such as identifying eligi-
ble countries by their percentages of world trade, national budgets, or
ranking on the United Nations’ Human Development Index.
10. Financial compensation will never be accepted.219
When all more meaningful objections have been used, some
critics cite the “showstopper” of unacceptability.220  Perhaps DSU
160’s most reasonable contribution to the development of WTO reme-
dies is that it shows financial compensation is feasible and determina-
ble, and that members will pay it.  Should financial compensation
become an official remedy, the EC could immediately request financial
compensation for the period of non-compliance from 2005–2009.  The
success of DSU 160 does not rule out future situations where financial
compensation may be hard to determine, where it is impractical, or
where countries refuse to pay.  Rather, DSU 160 demonstrates there
are situations in which financial compensation is a useful addition to
the WTO remedy toolkit and therefore should be added.
214 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 109, at 120–21.
215 Id. at 120.
216 Id.
217 Yang, supra note 107 at 452 (“It has been recognized that developing countries
can be given better incentives to utilize the WTO dispute settlement system if
monetary compensation is allowed.”).
218 Id.
219 Id. at 121.
220 Id.
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CONCLUSION
International law, much like the governments of democratic
nations, depends upon the consent of the governed.221  Successful in-
ternational legal systems respond to the needs of parties involved
while maintaining the integrity of the system.  The WTO faces a situa-
tion, as exemplified in DSU 160, in which its remedies do not meet the
needs of the members.  Large, powerful nations face difficult political
choices, and developing nations struggle to use a dispute settlement
system that does not provide them with enforcement strategies.  DSU
160 has demonstrated that parties are willing and able to pay for their
breaches.  WTO members and the Dispute Settlement Body should
make financial compensation a remedy alongside trade retaliation and
trade concessions.  The more diversity there is within the Dispute Set-
tlement Body enforcement toolkit, the greater the chance of compli-
ance within the WTO system.
221 JANIS & KAY, supra note 136, at xl. (citing H.L.A. Hart’s discussion of interna-
tional law as a system of primary rules of obligation without secondary rules to
efficiently make, recognize or enforce the primary rules).
